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Abstract: This paper argues in favour of a more thorough analysis of a specific set of dynamics taking 
place in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the latter being conceived as an informal organizational 
framework aimed at mutual learning (de Burca and Zeitlin, 2003) and policy change (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000; Radaelli, 2000). The aim of this paper is to uncover the missing link between these two elements, which 
has hitherto been black-boxed by the literature. Theoretical tools from International Relations (IR) theories (i.e. 
constructivist institutionalism) are borrowed in order to circumvent such a fallacy. The premises are the same as 
the ones hitherto employed by scholars studying the OMC (e.g. Jacobsson, 2004): can norms and values assume 
a binding character even outside the ‘territorially bounded democratic government’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 
2008) and  thus  leading  to policy  change?  If so,  how does  this phenomenon  take place? Nevertheless,  the 
approach is different, in that it builds on two closely interrelated factors: the concept of socialisation with its 
micro-processes (Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008) and the institutional characteristics of social environments 
(Rogowski, 1999). Accordingly, this paper will address the question: is the OMC in European employment 
policy a social environment conducive of socialisation?  
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The theoretical relevance of this topic is multifaceted. On the one hand, the OMC is conceived as 
a real novelty in the European modes of governance, being significantly different from the European 
precedent uses of soft law (i.e. the BEPG), from deliberative practices carried out by other international 
organisations, such as the OECD (Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003; Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004) and from 
benchmarking  procedures  employed  in  the  private  sector  (Jacobsson,  2004).  Accordingly,  many 
practitioners  emphasized  its  relevance  by  referring  to  the  OMC  as  the  „third  way  between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism‟ (Ekengren  & Jacobsson 2000). On  the other, the  vast    
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literature on the OMC and the modes of European governance has often fallen short in deepening the 
concept of „mutual learning‟ and its implications. Whilst many detailed analysis have been carried out 
in other specific aspects of the OMC (e.g. the benchmarking)
25, the majority of studies has failed in 
“[taking] account of the type of learning involved, where mimicking is merely one type of learning and 
probably not the most important one” (Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003 p.5).  
Two caveats are needed. First of all, a theoretical rather than an empirical approach is preferable 
for several reasons: the short life of the OMC; the difficulties in assessing policy change in such an 
indirect and non-binding process; the unreliability of Commission‟s evaluations being more rhetorical 
and political documents than a proper empirical analysis (Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004; EIPA, 2000). 
Secondly, the focus will be on the committees acting in the European employment policy, namely the 
EMCO and  its sub-groups:  the Ad  hoc  group and the Indicators  group
26. Indeed, the OMCs differ 
sensitively across issue areas  (Caviedes, 2004; Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004; Guy, 2008) and thus a 
macro approach is not viable. Furthermore, a micro approach is preferable for another reason, namely 
the  fact that  “a  constructivist ontology allows (even demands)  that  the  unit of socialization  is the 
individual  or  small  group”  (Johnston,  2001  p.34):  this  permits  to  focus  on  group  preferences  as 
preference  transformation,  typical  of  deliberative  practices,  rather  than  as  preference  aggregation 
(Johnston, 2001;  Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004).  The  focus on  European employment policy  may be 
explained also by the fact that similar but not equal practices to the OMC had been already in place in 
the European Employment Strategy (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004) before the Lisbon Strategy. In fact, 
the employment policy is perceived by many authors as the most developed example of OMC (e.g. 
Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003). 
 
1.  THE THEORETHICAL STATE OF ART: BRINGING SOCIALISATION IN 
 
Given the infinite literature on the OMC, the modes of European governance and the concept of 
policy  learning,  this section  limits the analysis to those theories which  focus on two  aspects: the 
institutional characteristics of committees and the concept of socialisation. Accordingly, the literature 
on European governance will be limited by the focus on policy, rather than polity or politics (Treib, 
Bahr and Falkner, 2007) and within this area, this paper will concentrate on the concept of deliberative 
                                                                 
25 For a detailed analysis of the process of benchmarking in the OMC see Arrowsmith J., Sisson K. and Marginson P., 2004, 
'What can 'benchmarking' offer the open method of co-ordination?', Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2), pp.311-328. 
26 Information about such committees is available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=115&langId=en.      
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democracy.  The  latter  may be conceived as a  mode of  governance whereby  norms and  values are 
interiorised and thus policy change is fostered through reasoning, arguing and persuasion dynamics (De 
la Porte and Nanz, 2004; Radulova, 2007; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004). De la Porte and Nanz (2004) 
identify three models of deliberative democracy: Habermas‟s procedural theory, Joerges‟s deliberative 
supranationalism  and  Sabel  and  Cohen‟s  directly  deliberative  polyarchy  (or  democratic 
experimentalism). In the first one the focus is on arguing and how it triggers policy change, which is 
perceived as preference transformation from micro to macro level rather than mere aggregation. Such 
an approach builds on Habermas‟s theory of communicative action, which stresses the importance of 
persuasion,  namely  the  interiorization  of    norms  and  values  through  the  logic  of  appropriateness 
(March and Olsen, 2009), though persuasion represents only one of the various processes which may 
lead policy change (Johnston, 2001). Sabel and Cohen‟s directly deliberative polyarchy emphasises the 
effectiveness of problem-solving deliberation through a bottom-up logic of participation (Eberlein and 
Kerwer, 2004), though the participatory character of the decision-making process eclipses the learning 
procedures. Indeed, learning processes are perceived only as the creation of a new common knowledge 
thus  neglecting  the  mechanisms  whereby  such  common  knowledge  is  formed.  Furthermore,  the 
democratic experimentalism theory, despite stressing the  importance  of the  institutional  framework 
(Eberlein and Kerwer, 2004), is more concerned on the two-level policy network between the local 
deliberative units and the central authority rather than the analysis the internal characteristics of the 
social environments. Joerges‟s deliberative supranationalism  focuses primarily on comitology, even 
though it may be applied also to other European committees (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004; Jacobsson 
and  Vifell,  2003).  Such  an  approach  is  the  most  suitable  for  the  objectives  of  this  paper  for  it 
concentrates on arguing as a mode of communication through the lenses of institutional requirements 
and not through public discourse (Neyer, 2003): only certain institutional conditions trigger learning 
processes.  
Deliberative supranationalism approach is to be integrated by a more thorough analysis of the 
micro-processes of socialisation in order to better comprehend the dynamics taking place in the OMC 
which have hitherto been labelled under the generic term „learning‟. A caveat is needed: this paper does 
not focus only on policy learning, but it tries to establish a connection between it and policy change. 
Indeed, many authors have deeply analysed the concept of learning (e.g. Hemerijck and Visser, 2003), 
but the majority have fallen short in going beyond and analyse the nexus between policy learning  and 
policy  change.  First  of  all  it  will  be  worth  deepening  the  concept  of  social  learning  and  policy    
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mimicking as they are conceived in this field of studies, namely the two main avenues to policy change 
(Hemerijck  and  Visser,  2003).  Social  learning  may  be  defined  as  “a  change  of  ideas  or  beliefs 
(cognitive and/or  normative orientations), skills or competences  as a  result of  the observation and 
interpretation  of  experience”  (Hemerijck  and  Visser,  2003,  p.5).  What  in  the  approach  to  policy 
learning is labelled as mimicking, namely borrowing or copying the others‟ behaviours as a rational 
way to face the challenges from the external environment, will be termed in this paper „emulation‟ for 
reasons which will be clear below. The main characteristics of social learning and policy mimicking 
may be appreciated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Social Learning v. Policy Mimicking 












Source:  Hemerijck  A.  and  Visser  J.,  2003,  Policy  Learning  in  European  Welfare  States,  unpublished  manuscript, 
Universities of Leyden and Amsterdam 
 
 This paper calls into question two aspects of the this approach. First of all, it is questionable that policy 
mimicking and social learning represent the only avenues to policy change: there are other reasons why 
policy change is fostered other than an analysis of previous experiences or the emulation of „the good 
guy‟. Indeed, this approach is too agent-centered and too rational in its premises, being based on a 
markedly  problem-solving  perspective.  As  a  consequence,  this  paper  integrates  such  an  approach 
utilised to analyse policy change in the OMC with the concept of socialisation employed in IR theories. 
The concept of socialisation  in IR theories has been  utilised since the very beginning though 
being under-theorised in the majority of cases (Johnston, 2001). Only with the constructivist turn both 
at the agent level (e.g. Wendt, 1992) and at the structure level (e.g. Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) such 
a concept commenced to be properly considered. Socialisation is not only conceived as a motivation for 
pro-norm behaviour, but also as something affecting the agent‟s identity and interests: “a process of 
internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them [actors] and affecting 
only behaviour [...]; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioural one” (Wendt, 1992 p. 
399).  Nevertheless,  constructivist  approach  to  socialisation  is  characterised  by  a  relevant  fallacy. 
Indeed, it tends to focus exclusively on persuasion as the only form of socialisation (Johnston, 2001).    
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Accordingly, socialisation  is  limited to a specific  meaning attached to persuasion close  in spirit to 
Habermas‟s theory of communicative action: deliberation as the strategic attempt to convince other 
actors in an inter pares situation through reasoning and arguing (Hasenclever et al, 1997). Given the 
non-exhaustive approach to socialisation provided by earlier constructivist theories, this paper builds 
on socialisation as theorised by Johnston (1993; 2001; 2008). Socialisation is seen as “a process by 
which  social  interaction  leads  [actors]  to  endorse  expected  ways  of  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting” 
(Johnston, 2001) and it comprises three micro-processes: mimicking, social influence and persuasion. 
This novel approach neatly differentiates learning from socialisation. In fact, teaching is only the first 
step in order to trigger socialisation processes, as illustrated in Figure 1. Once the agent is exposed to 
new  information and  stimuli  from  a social environment,  it  may change  its behaviour  for two  main 
reasons: socialisation or emulation.  
Emulation  is  a  (bounded)  rational  selection  of  perceived  successful  exemplars  in  order  to 
maximise utility; it also comprises a first-stage learning since the actor, first of all, has to comprehend 
the causal models which the successful exemplars utilise (Johnston, 2008). Social learning is not so 
different, in that it is based on rational premises and it entails learning too; the only difference is its 
inward-looking nature (Hemerijck  and Visser, 2003). 
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Source: Johnston A.I. (2008) Social states: China in international institutions, 1980-2000, Princeton University Press 
 
The theories on  the OMC and the  new  modes of European  governance (e.g.  Tömmel, 2009) 
implicitly entail something more than mere emulative processes, with continuous references to terms 
such as „socialisation‟ or „persuasion‟, without  going  further though.  Accordingly,  it will be worth 
analysing the concept of socialisation and its micro-processes. First of all, mimicking represents the 
borrowing  of  behaviours  and  attitudes  due  to  the  spirit  of  survival  in  a  novel  environment  or  in 
response to a novel stimulus. The action per se is the same as the one typical of emulation, though the 
logic behind it differs. In fact, emulation is driven by a rational choice, whereas mimicking is triggered 
Social normative structure 




Mimicking, persuasion, social influence 
Policies 
practices    
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by the necessity of survival in uncertainty (Johnston, 2008): “I shall do X because everyone seems to 
do  it  and  thus  survives.  So  until  I  know  better,  X  is  what  I  shall  do”(Betz,  Skowronski  and 
Ostrom,1996). Secondly, social influence conceives pro-norm behaviour as inherently interconnected 
with the social status of the agent in the social environment: social status markers, such as backpatting 
and opprobrium, are crucial in determining agent‟s attitudes:  “I believe the answer is X, but others said 
Y, and I do not want to rock the boat, so I shall say Y” (Betz, Skowronski and Ostrom,1996). Thirdly, 
whereas  social  influence  and  mimicking  are  characterized  by  a  rational  element,  namely  the 
maximization of a utility, persuasion is totally based on the „logic of appropriateness‟ (Johnston, 2001): 
“I do X because it is good and normal for me”(Betz, Skowronski and Ostrom,1996). Indeed persuasion 
represents public conformity due to private acceptance (Johnston, 2008). 
 
2.  THE EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEES AND SOCIALISATION 
 
This section analyses the committees acting within the European employment policy as a social 
environment with their own internal logics, norms, values etc. (Kohler-Koch, 2002 in Jacobsson and 
Vifell,  2003).  The  importance  to  focus  on  social  environments  when  analysing  the  process  of 
socialisation relies on several factors: the effects of social status markers are more pronounced in a 
restricted context (that is why social influence may be isolated only within delimited environments) and 
the same is true also for the role of norm-entrepreneurs, for instance. The assumption is that certain 
institutional  arrangements  (of  an  international  organisation  or  a  committee),  create  a  favourable 
environment for the conduction of one micro-process of socialisation or another. Johnston (2001;2008), 
building on  Rogowski‟s (1999)  model of strategic choice, draws a theory which  unites the  micro-
processes of socialisation and the institutional constraints of a social environment. This sections applies 
such an approach to the OMC practices taking place within  the European employment committees 
building also on the deliberative supranationalism approach to the European governance. The aim is to 
address the question: are the employment committees a social environment conducive of socialisation? 
If so, what type?  
 
      
C CE ES S   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er rs s, ,   I II II I, ,   ( (2 2) ), ,   2 20 01 11 1    362 
2.1. Membership  
 
A large membership influences the effects of social status markers within a group and the same is 
true also for a high level of publicity of internal dynamics, attitudes and behaviours (Johnston, 2001; 
Johnston, 2008). First of all,  many  authors stress  the difficulties  faced by bargaining dynamics  in 
presence  of  a  large  membership  (Neyer,  2003):  arguing  is  a  more  feasible  tactic  in  such  a  case. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the size of membership is relevant not only with respect to the mode of 
interaction  (i.e. bargaining or arguing), but also  it  is a precondition  for social  influence (Johnston, 
2001): large membership maximises the utility of backpatting and shaming
27. The reason is illustrated 
in Figure 2, which represents the passage from a situation  in which backpatting/opprobrium has no 
influence on the agent to a situation in which the agent is influenced by social status markers (i.e. a 
situation in which social influence is at work).  
 
   
                                                                 
27 A relevant issue derives from this assumption: the accumulation of social status markers. The latter have a more marked 
effect when the possibility of accumulation is available. There are several factors which may bolster such an organizational 
memory (Hemerijck and Visser, 2003): a structured secretariat, the availability of information in a database, the iterative 
nature of interaction etc. The EMCO and its sub-group present all these characteristics: a structured secretariat within the 
Commission, a rather high degree of availability of information with an online database and an average of 16 meetings a 
year (Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003).    
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Source:  Johnston,  A.I.  (2001),  “Treating  International  Institutions  as  Social  Environments”,  International  Studies 
Quarterly, 45(4): 487-515. 
 
As  demonstrated,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  participants  augments  the  effects  of 
backpatting/opprobrium and thus fostering cooperation. The EMCO consists of two representatives and 
two alternates for each member state and the sub-groups are composed of one representative and one 
alternate. Therefore, including the members of the EMCO Support Team and the ones of the EMCO 
Secretariat, an elevate number of officials operate in this sector meeting more than once a month in 





  K: members 
  C: payoffs of cooperation 
  D: payoffs of defection 
 
This figure represents an N-person prisoners‟ dilemma model, in 
which the utility of defection is always higher than the one of 
cooperation, regardless the size of membership (indeed, the D 





K  k 
Utility 
  k: equilibrium audience 
  C‟: payoffs of cooperation with the effect of backpatting 
  D‟: payoffs of defection with the effect of opprobrium 
 
The  influence of backpatting  makes  the C slope  more  upward 
(now C‟).  Indeed,  for any additional  member of the  group the 
utility  of  cooperation  increases  more  than  in  the  case  of  the 
previous C slope. 
The  influence  of  opprobrium  makes  D  slope  more  downward 
(now D‟). In  fact,  for any additional  member of  the  group the 
utility of defection increases less than in the case of the previous 
D slope. 
k represents the number of members of the group above which 
cooperation brings more utility than defection.    
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(Caviedes, 2004). Furthermore, several officials of the Commission and of the Council are involved in 
the daily work of EMCO and its sub-groups.
28 
Many scholars emphasize the importance of publicity as a factor supporting arguing rather than 
bargaining (Neyer, 2003), though publicity  has a  marked role also  in sustaining social  influence. 
Transparent procedures, the availability of information and the attention by mass media and the public 
opinion have a manifold effect. First of all, they are indispensable for the accumulation of social status 
markers, which in turn reinforces the social influence dynamics. Secondly, publicity creates two types 
of  constraints  on  actors:  the  consistency  constraints,  which  forces  the  agent  to  maintain  his/her 
precedent positions, and the plausibility one, which prevents actors to take unfeasible positions (Neyer, 
2003). As a consequence, publicity enhances the effects of backpatting and opprobrium, rendering thus 
cooperation a  more  viable strategy  than defection.  Despite  the availability of reports  and working 
documents on the Commission website (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004) and the vast academic literature 
developed during the last decade, publicity has hitherto shown weak effects on the internal dynamics of 
the employment committees due to two main reasons. First of all, the lack of an European-wide social 
and political platform has led to the segmentation of the public debate on employment policies (Neyer, 
2003; Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003), remained linked to the national arenas. Secondly, studies show that 
the media coverage of the employment policy is almost negligible at the EU level, being the focus on 
the national level (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004). As a result, “governments do not face pressure from 
broader public debate to comply with the recommendations of the EES” (Meyer, 2003 p.6). 
 
2.2. Franchise and Decision-making Rules
29 
 
Deliberative democracy theories underline the importance of authority allocation within a group: 
asymmetrical allocation bolsters bargaining dynamics (Meyer, 2003). Indeed, institutional constraints 
shape  modes of  interaction (Scharpf, 1997), but they also  influence the way  in  which socialisation 
mechanisms function. In fact, with an even allocation of authoritativeness the weight assigned to social 
status markers from each member of the group is equal and there is not only one „persuader‟
30. In the 
EMCO and in the two sub-groups the power is unevenly allocated, as stated by the internal procedural 
                                                                 
28 Given the uniqueness of the status of the EMCO and few other committees, which have a „double-hat‟ character being 
formally under both the Commission and the Council (Jacobsson, 2004) 
29 Johnston‟s model considers franchise and decision-making rules as two separate dimensions. This paper treats them as a 
single factor given the low importance of formal voting procedures within the employment committees. 
30 As in the case of persuasion, in which socialisation is closely interconnected with the relation between the persuadee and 
the persuader and the latter‟s specific characteristics (Johnston, 2001).    
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rules,  though  many  studies  emphasize  the  tendency  of  consensus-building  rather  than  voting 
(Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003; Haahr, 2004). As a consequence, although the QMV voting procedure 
allocates  more  power  to  certain  members  and  less  to  others  (Borrás  and  Jacobsson,  2004),  the 
consensus culture developed in such committees rebalances the situation. 
Another aspect is noteworthy: authority is not only related to institutional procedures or rules. In 
fact, within a  group an actor  may play the  role of  norm-entrepreneur even without  formal powers 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Many authors (some of them implicitly, e.g. Jacobsson, 2004, others 
explicitly, e.g. Schmidt, 2000) emphasise the role of the Commission as norm-entrepreneur, which is a 
characteristic  of  persuasive  dynamics  rather  than  social  influence.  The  Commission  has  played  a 
pivotal  role  with  respect  to  many  aspects.  First  of  all,  it  provides  materials,  logistic  support  and 
expertise  to  the  committees  through  the  secretariat  (Jacobsson,  2004).  Secondly,  it  bolsters  the 
diffusion of common framework of analysis of labour markets (Jacobsson, 2004; Kaiser and Prange, 
2004), such as the so called „flexicurity‟ at  the basis of  the  European Social Model.  Thirdly, the 
Commission has always promoted the use of EU jargon within the employment committees, but also in 
the  national  realm,  such  as  the  concepts  of  „prevention‟,  „activation‟  and  „lifelong  learning‟. 
Furthermore,  with  the  support  of  Eurobarometer  and  Eurostat  agencies,  it  has  spread  the  use  of 
objective criteria, common standards and statistics, which facilitates deliberative dynamics (Jacobsson, 
2004). Nevertheless, two points are important. First, “there have been no empirical tests on the extent 
of the Commission‟s influence as a norm entrepreneur” (De la Porte and Pochet, 2004 p. 72). Second, 
the role of  the Commission  may be perceived  more as a  „knowledge editor‟ than a proper  norm-
entrepreneur (Jacobsson, 2004). Indeed, despite acknowledging the fragility of this distinction, its role 
has been more oriented towards the diffusion of common theoretical and practical tools in order to 
create a fertile ground for deliberative dynamics, rather than proposing specific policy paradigms.  
 
2.3 Mandate and Autonomy Principal-agent
31 
 
Social influence is at work when agents enjoy little room for manoeuvre. Otherwise, independent 
agents are more likely to be persuaded if they enjoy a high level of discretionary power within the 
social environment (Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008). Empirical findings illustrate the tendency of the 
                                                                 
31 Also these two factors originally were distinct and then this paper has merged them given that the autonomy of the agent 
is strictly interconnected with the specific mandate with which the committees are invested from time to time (De la Porte 
and Nanz, 2004).    
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EMCO meetings towards becoming „drafting sessions‟ rather than deliberative fora (Radulova, 2007). 
Indeed, due to a more proactive role of the Presidency and more stringent agendas (De la Porte and 
Nanz, 2004), the EMCO meetings have gradually become fora in which locked national positions are 
engaged in a bargaining on the wording of the final documents (Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003). As a 
result,  more deliberative and  thus persuasive dynamics  have  moved  from the  EMCO to  the  more 
technical sub-committees (Jacobsson and Vifell, 2003; De la Porte and Nanz, 2004). Accordingly, the 
situation  radically  differs  according  to  the  mandate  which  the  committee  official  enjoys.  In  the 
Indicators group, for instance, where the mandate is markedly technical, officials enjoy large room for 
manoeuvre  and  thus  deliberative  dynamics  bolster  persuasion
32. Conversely,  in those occasions  in 
which there is a controversial issue on the agenda the EMCO is characterised by bargaining dynamics 
between fixed national positions and officials are constrained by precise political mandates. Yet in 
normal situations (i.e. no salient issue at stake) the EMCO officials are not restrained by so stringent 




As demonstrated, the employment committees acting according to the OMC represent a social 
environment close to the idealtype of social influence, as drawn by Johnston (2001; 2008). Needless to 
say,  reality and  theory are  not perfectly overlapping. For  instance, a  large  membership  is a  factor 
supporting social influence dynamics, though publicity has revealed to fall short in creating constraints 
on  the  internal  mechanisms  of  the  committees.  Furthermore,  although  an  even  allocation  of 
authoritativeness  creates  the  precondition  for  social  influence,  the  role  of  the  Commission  as 
„knowledge editor‟ may be perceived as a subtle way to act as a norm-entrepreneur and thus exerting 
influence (Schmidt, 2000). Finally, only in certain occasions that combination between mandate and 
autonomy typical of social influence arises. In fact, only when the political mandate of the committee 
concerns issues of not salient nature the autonomy of the agents is such that social status markers exert 
influence on them. As a consequence, when certain conditions are met, the OMC in the employment 
policy may be considered as a social environment conducive of social influence. 
                                                                 
32 Arguing on technical issues is suitable for the type of persuasion based on the content of the message (Johnston, 2008). In 
fact, scientific data, statistics etc. are perfect tools to support a persuasive strategy. Conversely, persuasive dynamics in  
political issues are more based on the prestige/authority of the persuader. For a detailed analysis of the types of persuasion 
see Johnston, 2001.    
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The objective of  this paper  is  to  focus on a topic often  under-theorised and to  illustrate the 
potentialities it bears. In fact, the nexus between policy learning and policy change within the OMC has 
hitherto been black-boxed by the literature: as stated above, there are other reasons why policy change 
is fostered other than an analysis of previous experiences or the emulation of „the good guy‟. An agent 
may adopt a policy paradigm because it is seen as the only sensitive and appropriate solution or due to 
the  necessity  of  recognition  within  a  group.  Future  research  projects  should  concentrate  on  the 
empirical analysis of social influence dynamics within these committees in order to verify the theory. 
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